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Scholars at the University of Arizona and elsewhere are
currently developing a fresh approach to mental health law.
This approach, known as "therapeutic jurisprudence," studies
the role of the law as a therapeutic agent.'
A new and highly interdisciplinary approach to the law
and mental health field, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests
that the law itself can be seen to function as a therapist or
therapeutic agent. Legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles
of legal actors (such as lawyers and judges) may act as social
forces that sometimes yield therapeutic or antitherapeutic con-
sequences. Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks "to identify-and
ultimately to examine empirically-relationships between legal
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1. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1990); DAVID
B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
Professor Winick teaches at the University of Miami Law School. The Wexler and
Winick book consists of essays written explicitly from a therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective and provides several concrete illustrations and applications of the
approach. The Wexler book is an anthology of somewhat older pieces that, while not
consciously written from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, can be seen as
implicitly embracing--and presaging-the therapeutic jurisprudence approach.
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arrangements and therapeutic outcomes."2
The therapeutic jurisprudence approach does not argue
that therapeutic concerns should supersede other considera-
tions, but only that empirical information from the social sci-
ences can inform legal decision-making and should indeed be
taken into account in legal decision-making.3 Within the limits
set by principles of justice, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests
that the law should be designed to serve more effectively as a
therapeutic agent. Naturally, then, therapeutic jurisprudence
has something to say about sex offenders and the legal appara-
tuses that may influence their mental health or behavior.4
At the University of Arizona, we hope to develop a series
of studies that will ultimately examine a variety of empirical
issues relating to the law and plea process with respect to sex
offenders.5 These studies arise from one particular therapeutic
jurisprudence application proposed by David Wexler and Bruce
Winick. This Article summarizes the empirical questions
raised by Wexler and Winick's theory and suggests how those
questions might be empirically analyzed.
A therapeutic jurisprudence approach also raises impor-
tant empirical questions regarding Washington's Sexually Vio-
lent Predators statute6 -the focus of the other papers in this
symposium. Later, in Part III, we examine some of those
issues, principally: (1) whether the Washington law actually
targets the least treatable sex offenders and discourages the
treatment of a larger sex offender population, (2) whether the
Washington law will encourage guilty defendants to deny their
guilt through the plea process, ultimately causing the law to
act as an antitherapeutic agent for sex offenders, and (3)
whether the Washington statute also provides an incentive for
2. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32 (1992).3. See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
979 (1991) (illustrating how the therapeutic jurisprudence "lens" can generate a new
set of research inquiries).
4. Therapeutic jurisprudence is concerned not only with the impact of the law on
cognitive processes, but also on behavioral processes. In the context of sex offenders,
the two processes are related. If offenders suffer from cognitive (thinking) distortions
that deny or minimize their culpability, they probably will not be motivated to change
their behavior so as to avoid reoffending.
5. These studies will assess various aspects of the plea process in the Pima County
Superior Courts in Tucson, Arizona.
6. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, §§ 1001-113, codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010-
.902 (Supp. 1990 & Supp. 1990-91). For a brief description of the law, see infra note 64.
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guilty sex offenders to protest their innocence and proceed to
trial in an effort to avoid indefinite incarceration, possibly
increasing the risk of perjury and extending the period of
denial through the trial and appeals process. We hope that our
discussion of these issues and the therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective presented in the Article will enrich the potential
research agenda relating to the Washington law.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS AND THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE
There is strong empirical evidence that sex offenders-
particularly child molesters--exhibit denial and minimization7
of their behaviors.' These so-called cognitive distortions9 pres-
ent a barrier to effective treatment and may themselves be a
focus of therapy.10 Therapeutic strategies such as "cognitive
restructuring"" have been developed to treat these distortions.
Cognitive restructuring bascially involves confronting the
offender with the evidence of his behaviors or engaging in role
7. Derek Perkins, Clinical Work With Sex Offenders in Secure Settings, in
CLINICAL APPROACHES TO SEX OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 151, 168 (Clive R.
Hollin & Kevin Howells eds., 1991); see also infra note 9.
8. Sex offenders may not be the only offenders who engage in denial and
minimization. Cognitive processes aimed at minimizing the psychically painful
realities of deviant behaviors may be a characteristic of all offenders. Such cognitive
processes have also been called "techniques of neutralization" and may include "denial
of responsibility," "denial of injury," "denial of the victim," "condemnation of the
condemners," and "appeal to higher loyalties." Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza,
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AMER. Soc. REV. 664, 666
(1956) (suggesting that these rationalizations may not only follow the deviant behavior,
but may even precede it, making the deviant behavior possible).
9. Nathan L. Pollock & Judith M. Hashmall, The Excuses of Child Molesters, 9
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 53, 54 (1991). See also Gene G. Abel et al., Complications, Consent
and Cognitions in Sex Between Children and Adults, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 89
(1984); Howard C. Stevenson et al., Treatment of Denial in Adolescent Sex Offenders
and Their Families, 14 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES & REHABILITATION 37
(1990); Linda S. Grossman & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Psychopathology and Denial in
Alleged Sex Offenders, 178 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 739 (1990); Ruth Sefarbi,
Admitters and Deniers Among Adolescent Sex Offenders and Their Families: A
Preliminary Study, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 460 (1990); Linda S. Grossman &
James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Do Sex Offenders Minimize Psychiatric Symptoms?, 34 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 881 (1989); David D. French, Distortion and Lying as Defense Processes
in the Adolescent Child Molester, 14 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES &
REHABILITATION 161 (1990). For a list of the types of distortions exhibited by child
molesters, see Gene G. Abel et al., The Measurement of Cognitive Distortions of Child
Molesters, 2 ANNALS OF SEX RESEARCH 135 (1989).
10. Perkins, supra note 7, at 152.
11. Gene G. Abel et al., Treatment Manual for Child Molesters (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors) [hereinafter Treatment Manual].
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reversals 12 in which the offender/patient must actively grapple
with the evidence of his illicit desires or morally reprehensible
behavior. Such treatment is geared toward leading the offend-
ers to "rethink their own cognitions. "13
A therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the sex offense
area might ask whether the law, which includes the roles of
laywers and judges as well as rules and procedures, has a ther-
apeutic or antitherapeutic impact on sex offenders. Wexler
and Winick' 4 have specifically questioned whether the law in
this area promotes cognitive restructuring or instead promotes
cognitive distortion, perhaps contributing to psychological dys-
function and criminality."5 It may well be, as Wexler and
Winick note, that "many aspects of the justice system are inad-
vertently geared towards fostering offender denial.'
' 6
Applying the therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the
plea process, Wexler and Winick theorize about how various
aspects of the criminal plea process may, either in a therapeu-
tic or antitherapeutic fashion, contribute to these cognitive dis-
tortions or promote cognitive restructuring.17  This is
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that plea bargains
are the dominant method for criminal adjudication.'"
12. When engaging in role reversal, "the therapist plays being the child-molester
who uses the various... cognitive distortions," and "the patients are asked to take the
role of a probation officer, a policeman, a family member, or anyone who might
interact with a child molester, and attempt to confront the beliefs role-played by the
therapist." Treatment Manual, supra note 11, at 39.
13. Id.
14. See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225
(1992).
15. There is some empirical evidence of a relationship between the legal process
and cognitive distortions of alleged sex offenders. See Linda S. Grossman & James L.
Cavanaugh, Jr., Psychopathology and Denial in Alleged Sex Offenders, 178 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 739, 742 (1990); Linda S. Grossman & James L.
Cavanaugh, Jr., Do Sex Offenders Minimize Psychiatric Symptoms?, 34 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 881 (1988) (concluding in both articles that patients facing no active legal charges
show significantly more psychopathology than those facing legal charges; they note,
however, that this result might be accounted for by sampling bias).
16. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14, quoting Perkins, supra note 7, at 152.
17. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14.
18. In Pima County, Arizona, from January to November of 1991, approximately
70% of all cases were disposed of through pleas. See also MARTIN S. GREENBERG & R.
BARRY RUBACK, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 116 (1982)
(stating that 75% to 90% of cases are disposed of through pleas, depending on the
jurisdiction); HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 17-22 (1966).
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II. AREAS OF POTENTIAL IMPACT
Several specific aspects of the plea process may affect cog-
nitive distortions or promote cognitive restructuring and are
the proper subject of empirical inquiry. For instance, the
pleading alternatives available to a sex offender defendant
(e.g., guilty pleas, not guilty pleas, and no contest pleas), the
type of concessions that might be offered (e.g., relating to sen-
tence leniency or reduced charge), and the judicial process of
establishing a factual basis for a plea may all function in a
therapeutic or antitherapeutic manner.
A. Pleading Alternatives
At arraignment, a criminal defendant is advised of the for-
mal charge and is typically called upon to enter a plea. 9 Ordi-
narily, the accused may plead "not guilty," "guilty," or "no
contest" (nolo contendere).2 ° Most often, the defendant will
initially plead not guilty. 21 If the defendant protests his inno-
cence and is unwilling to face the proscribed punishment, the
case usually goes to trial, and the trier of fact decides whether
the defendant is guilty.22 If the accused, however, ultimately
19. For an overview of the plea process and the judicial role in accepting pleas, see
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 21.1 to 21.6 (2d ed.
1992).
20. This discussion excludes special pleas such as "not guilty by reason of
insanity" or "guilty but mentally ill."
21. Acceptance of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere at this early stage has been
criticized. State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (Wis. 1964).
22. Even when a defendant refuses to plead guilty and thus goes to trial, the issues
related to denial do not end. For example, in Gilfillen v. State, 582 N.E.2d 821 (Ind.
1991), the defendant was convicted while denying guilt of child molesting. Despite
these denials, the trial court required the defendant to undergo sexual abuse therapy
as a condition of probation. The defendant attended the sessions, but continued to
protest his innocence. His probation was therefore revoked. On review, the Supreme
Court of Indiana held that because the defendant did not plead guilty and admit his
guilt, it was improper to require that he admit that he was guilty of the crimes
charged. Id. at 824. The court reasoned that "thought control" could not be imposed
as a condition of probation, nor could denial of guilt be a basis for revocation. Id. The
court did note, however, that denial might properly be used in "determining whether a
particular defendant is an appropriate candidate for probation in the first instance."
Id. The United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a similar
Montana case to determine whether requiring a man convicted of fondling a child to
attend a therapy program for sex offenders would force him to admit guilt in violation
of his right against self-incrimination. State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991), cert.
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. March 2, 1992) (No. 91-687). For a discussion of similar
issues, see generally Murray Levine & Eric Doherty, The Fifth Amendment and
Therapeutic Requirements to Admit Abuse, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 98 (1991).
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decides to plead guilty in some form, a change of plea hearing
is held.
The type of plea ultimately entered may impact a defend-
ant's cognitive distortions. Because sex offenders are usually
extremely unwilling to admit guilt, even when the state's evi-
dence is impressive, they often seek to plead "no contest." A
no contest plea permits the sex offender to accept the conse-
quences of a conviction without trial and without admitting
guilt.23 Indeed, some sex offenders, according to Wexler and
Winick, will seek to enter so-called Alford pleas, whereby a
defendant is permitted to plead guilty while at the same time
protesting his innocence.24
Acceptance of Alford pleas and no contest pleas may rein-
force cognitive distortions and denial, thereby undermining
treatment efforts.25 On the other hand, rejecting such pleas
might induce defense lawyers to encourage those clients who
have no plausible defenses to plead guilty. In essence, this
would engage defendants in an exercise of cognitive restructur-
ing that includes role reversal.26 For example, the defense
23. For cases where sex offenders pled no contest, see, e.g., State v. Dishong, 594
P.2d 84 (Ariz. 1979) (no contest plea to child molestation) and State v. Snyder, 544 P.2d
230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (no contest plea to lewd acts upon a minor child). More
recently, a case capturing the public eye involved Paul Reubens, better known as "Pee
Wee Herman," who pled no contest to a charge of indecent exposure. See James
Martinez, Pee-wee Pleads No Contest in Indecency Case, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Nov. 8,
1991, at All.
24. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that a defendant may be motivated to plead guilty for reasons other than
his actual guilt of the offense charged. So long as the plea is a product of free and
intelligent choice and a factual basis supports the plea, the Court held that an express
admission of guilt is not a constitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a criminal
penalty following a conviction based upon a guilty plea. Id. at 37. See Curtis L.
Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal
Defendant, 72 IOwA.L. REv. 1063 (1987); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1280, 1286 n.290 (1975) (discussing pleas in
sex offender cases). For cases where sex offenders entered Alford pleas, see, e.g., State
v. Draper, 784 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1989) (Alford plea to attempted child molestation); and
State v. Fowler, 670 P.2d 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (Alford plea to sexual assault).
25. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14.
26. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14. As Alschuler noted:
It may often be a lawyer's duty to emphasize in harsh terms the force of the
prosecution's evidence: "What about this fact? Is it going to go away? How
the hell would you vote if you were a juror in your case?" It may sometimes
be a lawyer's duty to say bluntly, "I cannot possibly beat this case. You are
going to spend a long time in jail, and the only question is how long."
Alschuler, supra note 24, at 1309.
Defense attorneys can and should give clients a realistic appraisal of the
probability of conviction and the potential sentences imposed for guilty pleas in such
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attorney might ask the defendant, "How would you vote if you
were a juror in your case?" If research supports the hypothesis
that Alford pleas and no contest pleas reinforce cognitive dis-
tortions and denial, perhaps judges should be reluctant to
accept such pleas27 from sex offenders on therapeutic grounds.
This proposal raises several interesting empirical ques-
tions. For instance, are different types of defendants more
likely to enter a certain type of plea, and more precisely, are
sex offenders more likely than other offenders to enter, or to
attempt to enter, no contest or Alford pleas?28 The broader
question is whether Alford or no contest pleas actually contrib-
ute to a sex offender's cognitive distortions or treatment refus-
als more than ordinary guilty pleas. In other words, does
accepting or denying Alford and no contest pleas affect the
existence of cognitive distortions or the acceptance of offers of
treatment?
cases. Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 99, 101 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 843
(1959). Counsel are given great leeway in encouraging clients without possible
defenses to plead guilty. People v. Adams, 50 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1334 (Colo. Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 1991). Nonetheless, when advising a defendant that the evidence against
him is so overwhelming that a guilty plea is his best salvation, counsel must be careful
not to advise the defendant to depart from truth if need be in order to establish facts
that show he is guilty. Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The trial judge must also be cautious. See State v. Cain, 733 P.2d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987) ("trial judge engaged in a very questionable practice in permitting the defense
attorney to lay the factual basis for the plea, when it may be in the defendant's best
interest to have error introduced into the record"). Id. at 679. Moreover, the thera-
peutic impact of guilty pleas "might be further buttressed by a judicial sentencing pol-
icy particularly unsympathetic to sex offenders who stand trial and offer a defense
rejected by the jury and considered perjurious by the judge." Wexler & Winick, supra
note 14.
27. Because a criminal defendant has no absolute constitutional right to have his
guilty plea accepted by the court, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970), the
court retains discretion to accept or reject such pleas. Compare United States v. Biscoe,
518 F.2d 95, 96 (lst Cir. 1975) (refusal of guilty plea was not abuse of discretion where
evidence was weak and defendant denied crime); and United States v. Cepeda Penes,
577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1978) (no abuse of discretion in refusing nolo plea for which
no factual basis was shown, "for acceptance of a nolo plea is solely a matter of grace");
with State v. Dillon, 748 P.2d 856, 859 (Kan. 1988) (nolo plea may not be rejected
because of defendant's failure to admit facts establishing guilt, as a contrary conclusion
"would virtually abolish any reason to plead nolo contendere"); and United States v.
Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (abuse of discretion to refuse a guilty plea
solely because the defendant equivocates and does not admit the alleged facts of the
crime). As suggested here, however, having the defendant admit guilt might be
effective in maximizing the rehabilitative effects of the prosecution. See 3 ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-1.2 (2d ed. 1980).
28. Such data might be collected through archived court records or through the
County Attorney's Office's data system. This data could also be collected by observing
plea hearings and recording the type of plea entered and the offense charged.
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Other questions address the role of the defense attorney.
For example, when preparing the defendant for a trial or a
plea bargain, does the defense attorney's behavior affect the
offender's denial? The defense attorney may possibly engage
the client in cognitive restructuring by confronting him with
the damning evidence against him or by playing role reversal.29
A researcher could measure such interactions by observing
meetings between the attorney and client and then analyzing
the content of their interaction. Because the defendants' con-
tacts with others during the time period under study would be
uncontrolled, these uncontrolled contacts offer a rival explana-
tion for any finding. On the other hand, consistent causal find-
ings in regard to defendants' cognitive distortions, treatment
choices, and treatment outcomes, which differ between attor-
neys who do and do not engage in cognitive restructuring,
would lessen the vitality of the rival hypothesis.
It might be that refusals of nolo and Alford pleas might
lead some savvy defense attorneys not to engage their clients
in cognitive restructuring. Rather, those attorneys might peti-
tion for a change of judge after identifying those judges who
become infamous for either not letting the defendant off the
hook with respect to admitting guilt or refusing to accept
Alford or nolo contendere pleas. This practice would poten-
tially bias the sample of offenders who come before any partic-
ular judge.
B. Type of Concession
The possibility of concessions in charging and sentencing
play a major role in inducing defendants to enter into plea bar-
gains. Two principal types of plea bargains include "charge"
bargaining and "sentence" bargaining." Sentence bargaining
occurs when an offender is charged with the actual crime the
state believes he committed, but receives a sentence concession
for an "on-the-nose" plea of guilty to that charge.3 Charge
bargaining, on the other hand, occurs when an offender is
charged with the actual crime the state believes he committed,
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. Two other types of concessions include charge dismissal and avoidance of
prosecution under specialized statutes. DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 97 (1966).
31. H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 109 (1977).
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but is allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge.12 Charge
bargaining, rather than sentence bargaining, is particularly
prevalent in jurisdictions where mandatory sentencing has
stiffened the potential penalties and shifted discretion from the
courts in sentencing to the prosecution in charging.3  Defend-
ants in these jurisdictions seek this concession because it
results in a less serious criminal record and restricts the statu-
tory range of penalties that may be applied. 4
Charge bargaining may feed into cognitive distortions
more so than sentence bargaining. Presumably charge bargain-
ing gives the sex offender an opportunity to avoid admitting
guilt to the actual charged conduct by admitting guilt to a less
serious crime.3 5 For example, if someone charged with child
molestation is allowed to plead guilty to assault, this allowance
might feed into the offender's denial: even the state has con-
ceded that the defendant is guilty not of the charged conduct,
but of a less serious crime."
32. Uviller, supra note 31, at 108; see also NEWMAN, supra note 30.
33. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A
Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 550 (1978); Kenneth Adams, The Fffect of Evidentiary Factors on Charge
Reduction, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 525 (1983) (evidentiary strength is inversely related to
prosecutorial charge concessions).
34. NEWMAN, supra note 30.
35. The reduced offense must bear some categorical similarity to the original
charge. State v. Norris, 558 P.2d 903, 905 (Ariz. 1976); State v. McGhee, 551 P.2d 568,
571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). This would be preferred from a therapeutic standpoint, so
that the defendant would be forced to admit guilt of a crime that is at least related to
the sexually deviant conduct. See People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 420 (Cal. 1970)
(adopting the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice position that requiring a reasonable
relation between the crime pleaded to and the defendant's actual conduct "will not be
grossly misleading and thus will not likely result in inappropriate correctional
treatment or police suspicion") (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY 68 (1967)). Although the reduced offense must relate to the original charge,
the "factual basis" must relate to the crime to which the defendant is pleading. See
infra note 54.
36. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 733 P.2d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), where defendant,
originally charged with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor, pled guilty to one
count of aggravated assault. The trial court found a factual basis for the plea, but the
appellate court determined that the trial court was in error because the defendant's
conduct did not establish the elements of aggravated assault. The Cain court noted
that
[i]t behooves the trial judge in the acceptance of a plea of guilty to determine
exactly what statute is claimed to be violated and personally make sure the
factual basis obtained from the defendant is sufficient. The prosecutor
certainly has the same duty and should assist the trial judge in establishing an
appropriate factual basis.
Id at 679. See also State v. Altamirano, 803 P.2d 425 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (plea agree-
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The ultimate question is whether the type of concession
affects cognitive distortions. An empirical examination of
these issues begins with an assessment of the types of bargains
entered in the courts38 in an effort to determine whether the
charged offense bears any relationship to the type of conces-
sion offered. 9
C. Establishment of the Factual Basis of the Plea
Change of plea hearings offer an opportunity for judges to
accept or reject plea agreements. The judge must determine
not only whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily
entered into by the defendant, but also whether a factual basis
for the plea exists.4" In Arizona, for example, a court can and
must find a factual basis despite the defendant's denial of
guilt41 or plea of no contest.4 2 It is particularly incumbent
ment of defendant charged with one count of sexual abuse and one count of burglary
included dismissal of sexual abuse charge).
37, Investigation of this question might be difficult if limited to a single
jurisdiction, given the unlikelihood that both types of concessions would coexist with
sufficient variability in any one jurisdiction. Empirical inquiry of this question might
be better addressed in a cross-jurisdictional design involving the comparison of the
cognitive distortions of sex offenders in a jurisdiction predominantly employing charge
bargaining with those in a jurisdiction where sentence bargaining is the norm.
38. Such data would be available through archived records or through the
prosecutor's office.
39. See Hunter A. McAllister & Norman J. Bregman, Plea Bargaining by
Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Decision Theory Approach, 71 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 686 (1986) (discussing the ways in which probability of conviction affects plea
bargaining decisions of defense attorneys and prosecutors); Kenneth S. Bordens &
John Bassett, The Plea Bargaining Process From the Defendant's Perspective: A Field
Investigation, 6 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 93 (1985) (analyzing the factors that
may affect a defendant's decision to accept a plea bargain); Kenneth Adams, The Effect
of Evidentiary Factors on Charge Reduction, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 525 (1983) (examining
the relationship of evidence going to strength of prosecutor's case to charge reduction).
40. "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter
a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is
a factual basis for the plea." FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(f); see also Ariz. R. Crim. Proc.
17.3; Wash. Cr. R. 4.2(d).
41. The defendant could make two kinds of express denials: (1) defendant might
make a complete denial of involvement in any act or conduct that might constitute a
criminal offense, or (2) the defendant might admit he performed an act which would
be criminal if accompanied by the requisite state of mind, but equivocate as to his state
of mind at the time of the act. 8 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
11.07[2] (1990).
42. State v. Draper, 784 P.2d 259, 262 (Ariz. 1989) (Alford plea requires factual
basis for crime charged); State v. Moreno, 492 P.2d 440 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (factual
basis for guilty plea necessary before judgment is entered); State v. Page, 564 P.2d 379,
380 (Ariz. 1977) (factual basis must support each element of crime to which defendant
pleads no contest); State v. Dixon, 523 P.2d 789, 791 (Ariz. 1974) (guilty plea may be
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upon the judge to determine that a factual basis for the plea
exists in those instances in which a defendant denies an ele-
ment of the crime.4"
The defendant's admissions at a plea hearing are not the
only evidence that may be used to establish a factual basis for
the plea. The factual basis for a plea may also be established
by the extended record, including the presentence report, pre-
liminary hearing transcripts, grand jury proceedings, and other
sources." Some courts reason, however, that a "dialogue
between the court and the person making the plea is the best
method" for establishing a factual basis for the plea, especially
if the dialogue occurs "in a manner that requires the accused
to provide narrative responses. ''45  The dialogue approach
appears to have the greatest therapeutic potential because the
offender could be required to give a detailed account of his
offense on the record. By questioning the offender in detail
about his conduct, judges could help break through offender
denial.46 In this respect, the law presents the judge with the
opportunity to engage the offender in a session of cognitive
restructuring. Ideally, the judge would specifically address on
the record some of the matters typically subject to cognitive
distortion by sex offenders.47 The judge might even specifi-
cally attempt to engage defendants in cognitive restructuring
when seeking to establish a factual basis for the plea.48
accepted even though defendant does not admit guilt if court is careful to ascertain
there was a factual basis); State v. Brooks, 586 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Ariz. 1978) (upholding
guilty plea in child molestation case despite absence of explicit statement by defendant
that acts were motivated by abnormal sexual interest in children). Other jurisdictions
require no such finding. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.
1976) (court need not find a factual basis for a plea of nolo contendere); State v. Steele,
620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo. 1980) (court may accept plea of nolo contendere without first
satisfying itself that the defendant committed the crime).
43. State v. Reynolds, 544 P.2d 233, 237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). See also Collins v.
Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1346 (Ariz. 1988) (Constitution requires state courts to
establish factual basis if defendant maintains his innocence while entering guilty plea).
See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 21.4(f) at
939 (2d ed. 1992) ("when a pleading defendant denies the crime, the factual basis must
be significantly more certain than will suffice in other circumstances") (citations
omitted).
44. State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432, 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Freda, 590
P.2d 1376, 1378 (Ariz. 1979).
45. United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 356 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1029 (1986). See also State v. Schulz, 409 N.W.2d 655, 659 (S.D. 1987) ("a personal
conversation between the judge and the defendant is clearly the best method").
46. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14.
47. Wexler & Winick, supra note 14.
48. An interesting study might involve the development of a "model" colloquy
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Several empirical questions follow from this discussion.
The broadest question is whether the process as a whole fos-
ters acceptance of or success in treatment, or at least lessens
cognitive distortions so that effective treatment becomes possi-
ble. Narrower inquiries may shed light on this broader ques-
tion. For example, to what extent do judges, in establishing a
factual basis for the plea, require defendants to admit guilt for
the charged offenses? More specifically, do judges require
defendants to describe their conduct in detail in narrative
form,49 or do judges allow defendants to simply answer "yes"
or "no'150 when questioned about whether certain acts were
committed?5' How hesitant52 are sex offenders, as compared to
based on principles of cognitive restructuring, followed by an experiment wherein one
group of judges follows the model while another conducts business as usual.
Measurement of cognitive distortion of offenders at designated times before and after
the plea hearing might shed light on whether the judicial inquiry into the factual basis
of the plea reduces cognitive distortions. Such "model" or "checklist" colloquies have
been suggested for other reasons. See generally Mary Kay Wheeler, Guilty Plea
Colloquies: Let the Record Show .. , 45 MONT. L. REV. 295 (1984).
49. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1973) (advocating
meticulous questioning of defendant). This enterprise raises the question whether
judges should and will be interested in trying to perform a therapeutic as well as a
"strictly" judicial function. The argument that they should appears in a somewhat
different context in David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the
Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27 ClM. L. BULL. 18, 40 (1991) (like it
or not, judicial behavior presumably has a therapeutic or anti-therapeutic impact, so
courts should behave to better society). Whether judges will behave in a therapeutic
manner is, of course, another question. Some probably will. Moreover, the students of
today-who will be the judges of tomorrow--are far more accustomed to viewing the
law and legal roles in an interdisciplinary manner. When they ascend to the bench,
they may be inclined to consider and follow these sorts of recommendations.
50. A mere affirmative response by a defendant as to whether he committed the
crime charged may be insufficient. State v. Durham, 498 P.2d 149, 151 (Ariz. 1972).
But see State v. Newman, 504 P.2d 55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Schulenberg, 503
P.2d 411, 412 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). Cf. Jones v. State, 705 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Ark. 1986)
(asking defendant to merely state conclusion that there is a factual basis disapproved).
51. Such data might be gathered by observing plea hearings and categorizing the
type of responses sought by judges. It may be that the type of inquiry is related not to
the type of offense, but simply to judicial style and personality. That is, some judges
might be more concerned with establishing a factual basis by narration than others.
52. Such hesitancy might take at least three forms: (1) outright denial of the facts
relating to the charged conduct; (2) concealment, by speaking in generalities or
otherwise avoiding admitting the facts; and (3) offering of mitigations or explanations
(specific cognitive distortions) for the conduct. See Susan U. Philips, Criminal
Defendant's Resistance to Confessions in the Guilty Plea (1990) (unpublished paper
prepared for session on "Different Discourses in and around the Law II," Law and
Society Association Meetings, May 31 to June 3, 1990, Berkeley, California, on file with
the authors). These hesitations might be easily measured and categorized by observing
offenders during plea hearings. Another question raised by the defendant's hesitation
is whether and in what ways judges differentially respond to these different
hesitations. For instance, do judges probe harder into the defendant's outright denial
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other offenders, to freely admit the charged conduct?53 Do
judges allow defendants to avoid detailed responses when the
defendants have difficulty describing their criminal actions, or
do most judges inquire further as to why the defendant is hav-
ing a difficult time admitting the crime given the fact that he is
pleading guilty? If the factual basis for the pled charge is ques-
tionable because of charge bargaining, does the judge reject the
plea or simply permit the defendant to admit to lesser
conduct?'
Judges are not the only legal actors capable of affecting
the sex offender's cognitive processes. Defense attorneys may
hinder cognitive restructuring when they come to the rescue of
defendants who are having difficulty admitting guilt. For
example, attorneys may do this by filling in the difficult details
omitted by the defendants.5  When an attorney engages in
this behavior, the judge may affect the cognitive restructuring
process depending on whether the judge permits this type of
assistance or insists that it be the defendant who admits to the
criminal conduct.56
Many other questions stem from the plea bargaining pro-
cess and could also be addressed by research. For example,
does the number of persons in the courtroom affect a defend-
ant's willingness to admit his guilt?5  Also, does the gender of
the judge or defendant have any influence on the defendant's
of the facts than they do when the defendant simply offers explanations? There is
some preliminary evidence that they do. See id.
53. There is some anecdotal evidence that sex offenders are hesitant to admit guilt
at guilty plea hearings. See, e.g., State v. Smullen, 571 A.2d 1305, 1306 (N.J. 1990)
(noting hesitancy of defendants charged with sex offenses to elaborate on factual basis
of plea); State v. Denning, 155 747 P.2d 620, 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (in guilty plea
hearing of defendant for sexual assault of 15-year-old girl, defendant denied an
element of the crime and vacillated during the judge's questioning). The same,
however, has been said about offenders in general. Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d
113, 120 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting human tendency of defendants "to deny or gloss
over their involvement"); see supra note 8.
54. The factual basis must relate not to the original charge being dismissed
pursuant to a charge bargain, but to the crime to which the defendant is pleading.
State v. Louden, 619 P.2d 758, 760 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Ohta, 562 P.2d 369,
370-71 (Ariz. 1977). Such a rule may be antitherapeutic.
55. Generalized admissions or statements by defense counsel may not be sufficient
to establish factual basis. United States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 1970).
56. See supra note 26.
57. Larger numbers of people may make it more difficult for a defendant to admit
guilt. However, those who do admit guilt in a full courtroom jump the difficult hurdle
of publically admitting guilt, perhaps paving the way for successful treatment. This
sort of "double-edged sword" is an interesting problem in and of itself and exemplifies
a general issue in therapeutic jurisprudence.
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willingness to admit guilt and give a detailed account of the
offense conduct? For example, a male offender may be less
likely to admit his crimes to a female judge than he would to a
male judge. 8 On the other hand, those who do make admis-
sions, despite the added difficulty, might experience a greater
"breakthrough," making them better candidates for treatment
success.
Willingness to admit guilt might depend on other factors,
such as the defendant's age59  and criminal history,60 the
victim's age61 and gender, 2  and the type of behavior the
defendant is alleged to have exhibited.63 Other interesting cor-
relations may arise as a result of interactions between or
among these variables.
III. THE WASHINGTON SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTE
Any evaluation of Washington's Sexually Violent
Predators statute6 should at least explore the potential thera-
peutic or antitherapeutic consequences of the law's implemen-
58. If a relationship exists, it might have interesting therapeutic implications not
only for judges, but also for therapists of either gender.
59. Perhaps younger offenders are less hesitant to admit guilt than older
offenders, or vice versa.
60. It might be that first time offenders are more willing to admit guilt than
repeat offenders, or vice versa.
61. Offenders may become more reluctant to admit to offense conduct as the age
of the victim decreases. Because sexual contact with an infant, for example, might be
seen as more reprehensible and embarrassing than sexual contact with a 17-year-old, it
might be more difficult for an offender to admit to the former conduct to a judge.
62. For instance, it might be more difficult for male defendants to admit to sexual
contact with male victims, and perhaps even more difficult to admit such conduct to
female judges.
63. For example, it may be more difficult for a defendant to describe an act of anal
intercourse with a young boy than it would to describe an act of vaginal intercourse
with a girl in her late teens.
64. Washington's Sexually Violent Predators statute allows the state to
indefinitely commit individuals who are found to be "sexually violent predators."
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (Supp. 1990-91). A sexually violent predator is defined as
any individual who has been charged or convicted of a crime of sexual violence and
who has additionally suffered from a personality disorder or mental abnormality that
makes him or her likely to reoffend. Id. § 71.09.020(1)-(4). An action to commit a
sexual predator commences when a prosecuting attorney or attorney general files a
petition alleging that an individual is a sexually violent predator. Id. § 71.09.030. The
action is then brought to trial. Any individual adjudicated to be a sexually violent
predator is then indefinitely committed to the state department of social and health
services (DSHS) special commitment center for care and treatment. Id. § 71.09.060.
The offender may only be released if DSHS determines he or she is no longer
dangerous, or if the offender directly petitions the court for release. Id. § 71.09.090.
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tation and take into account the empirical investigation of
those consequences.
The Washington law raises a therapeutic jurisprudential
issue that relates rather directly to the focus of this Article:
cognitive distortions and the plea process.65 The Washington
law is triggered by a criminal conviction for a qualifying sexual
offense; as a result, the prospect of indefinite commitment
under the law may discourage guilty defendants from pleading
guilty to potentially qualifying sexual offenses, thus sapping
the legal system of a cognitive restructuring possibility.6
Rather than plead guilty to a qualifying offense, defendants
may instead choose between two additional alternatives. On
the one hand, they might try to "charge bargain" to a nonquali-
fying offense, thus triggering the possible cognitive distortion
problems discussed earlier. On the other hand, the prospect of
commitment under the statute might encourage guilty defend-
ants to proceed to trial in an effort to try to beat the qualifying
sex conviction, possibly resorting to perjury. If such defend-
ants are nonetheless convicted, the trial and their trial testi-
mony could serve to strengthen their cognitive distortions and
their resistance to therapy. Further, given the fact that they
were convicted after a trial rather than after a plea of guilty, a
reasonable chance exists that their convictions will be
appealed. The pendency of the appellate process will provide
still another disincentive to admit the commission of the
65. Still other issues exist. For example, one might ask whether attempting to
deter those who offend against strangers with such long-term losses of liberty might
induce those offenders to reduce predation of strangers, but to then focus their sexual
attentions on younger family members. Another unfortunate result might be that
some offenders would become more likely to kill their victims to decrease the chances
of detection, apprehension, and identification as a sexual predator subject to the
Washington law.
66. On the other hand, in certain cases prosecutors might agree, in exchange for a
guilty plea to a qualifying offense, not to use the particular offense pled as a trigger for
commitment under the statute. The law could then be used as an incentive for the
guilty offender to plead guilty and to admit guilt to the charged offense. Absent the
fear of being identified as predators, some offenders might be more inclined to seek
treatment in prison in hopes of preventing future offenses that could again expose
them to potential commitment under the statute. The question remains, however,
whether the promise not to invoke the predator law in the event of a guilty plea
(which might turn into a threat to invoke the law following a contested trial and
conviction) is an undue exercise of prosecutorial power. For a law and economics
analysis of the costs and benefits of plea bargaining in the context of high penalty
provisions, see Bruce H. Kobayashi & John R. Lott, Jr., Low-probability-High-penalty
Enforcement Strategies and the Efficient Operation of the Plea-Bargaining System, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 69 (1992).
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underlying acts.6 7
The Washington Sexually Violent Predators statute raises
other therapeutic jurisprudence inquiries. Does the Washing-
ton law actually target the least treatable sex offenders?6 8 If
so, the ordinary prison population would house a more treata-
ble universe. The Washington law, however, may operate to
encourage incarcerated sex offenders to avoid treatment in
prison for fear of being identified as possible candidates for the
special law, as Professor La Fond suggests.6 9 A law that con-
fines and attempts to treat a tiny number of perhaps untreat-
able persons may ultimately discourage treatment of a much
larger group of more treatable persons. If that is the case, the
Washington law may prove to be antitherapeutic, a result that
would not occur if sex offenders were processed under the
criminal code without the disincentive of indefinite incarcera-
tion provided by the Washington law.7 °
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the legal procedures involved in
sex offender pleas feed into cognitive distortions is complex.
67. The disincentive is noted in State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 983 (Mont. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260 (1992).
68. See Robert M. Wettstein, Psychiatric Perspectives on Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597 (1992).
69. See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A
Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 655 (1992). Of course, this is an empirical question, and it is at least conceivable
that the existence of the special law might lead offenders to seek out treatment in
prison-in the hope that successful treatment will lessen the chances of being
processed under the law.
If [sex offenders] have had sex offender treatment in prison, that is something
that we review and assess prior to filing.... In some of these cases that have
been reviewed, they have not been filed because the experts have determined
(psychologists, psychiatrists in the prison system) that indeed the person has
benefitted from the sexual deviancy treatment, and those people we have not
found enough of a basis upon which to file.
Circle of Fear (PBS television broadcast, November 12, 1991) (remarks of Jeanne
Tweten, Washington Assistant Attorney General, on the mitigating aspects of treat-
ment as a consideration in filing an action under the Washington statute).
70. The only type of offenders who are now processed as sexual offenders are
repeat offenders: "Everybody that has been filed against has had a prior pattern of
sexually violent offenses-in" fact, that's a threshold to our filing that kind of case." Id.
For these repeat offenders, a recidivist penalty could be applied. The prospect of a
later potential recidivist penalty, however, should in no way discourage a first-time
offender from seeking prison treatment. To the contrary, it should motivate first
offenders to deal with their problems so as not to risk a subsequent offense-and an
enhanced sentence under the recidivist law.
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As indicated by the above discussion, the empirical questions
are abundant and provide fertile ground for empirical inquiry.
Policy decisions based on such a therapeutic jurisprudential
theory would benefit from a firm foundation of empirical
research. This Article demonstrates how therapeutic jurispru-
dence can give rise to numerous intriguing and novel questions
that are readily amenable to scientific analysis.
A therapeutic jurisprudence perspective also reveals that
the Washington law may have a potentially antitherapeutic
impact on areas beyond the sex offender commitment statute
itself. The law may affect the motivation of convicted sex
offenders to seek treatment in prison, and it may affect the
motivation of sex offenders to enter guilty pleas. Examining
the law with a therapeutic jurisprudence lens helps to shed
light on such matters. We hope our Article will encourage
scholars and policy makers interested in the Washington law
to explore these and related questions.
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